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KEEPING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
RELEVANT
J.B. RUHL†
ABSTRACT
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) has long been the workhorse
of species protection in contexts for which a species-specific approach
can effectively be employed to address discrete human-induced threats
that have straightforward causal connections to the decline of a species,
such as clearing of occupied habitat for development or damming of a
river.
Its resounding success there, however, has led to the
misperception that it can duplicate that record anywhere and for any
reason a species is at risk. Yet, is the statute adaptable to the sprawling,
sometimes global, phenomena that are wearing down our
environmental fabric on landscape scales through complex causal
mechanisms? For example, can the ESA effectively be used to combat
climate change by regulating greenhouse gas emissions, to combat the
impacts of urbanization by mandating green buildings, or to mitigate
ecological degradation by demanding that resource users take into
account the values of natural capital and ecosystem services? This
article suggests that it would be unwise to push the ESA in that
direction, but that the ESA nonetheless has a supporting role to play in
the development of policies designed to address those problems. In
particular, the ESA should be focused toward consolidating its core
power to arrest the conversion of intact habitat to urban land uses, and
from there it should be used to leverage its habitat protection function
to promote policies responding to climate change, urban impacts,
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ecological degradation, and other ecological problems characterized by
complex, large-scale, indirect causal mechanisms.

I. INTRODUCTION
At a time when climate change, the impacts of expanding
urbanization, and the deterioration of ecological systems threaten to
push an ever-growing number of species into dire conditions,1 it may
seem preposterous to suggest, as the title of this article does, that the
2
Endangered Species Act (ESA) could be in danger of becoming
irrelevant. But the question is not whether a policy aimed toward
managing the species imperilment problem is relevant—it appears we
will need one in the Obama Administration and well into the
future3—but rather, whether the ESA in particular is well-positioned

1. See, e.g., Stuart Pimm et al., Human Impacts on the Rates of Recent, Past, and Future
Bird Extinctions, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 10941, 10941 (2006) (stating that, based on
historical trends, at least twelve percent of bird species in North America will become extinct in
the twenty-first century); Anthony Ricciardi & Joseph B. Rasmussen, Extinction Rates of North
American Freshwater Fauna, 13 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1220, 1220 (1999) (predicting a four
percent future extinction rate per year for freshwater fauna, which is five times higher than for
terrestrial fauna).
2. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2006). This article is not
intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the ESA. Rather, it focuses on suggesting
broad themes for implementing the statute in the new Administration. For comprehensive
treatments of the ESA, several of which are referred to frequently infra, see generally MICHAEL
J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (3d ed.
1997); ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES (Donald C. Baur &
Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002) [hereinafter LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES]; LAWRENCE R.
LIEBESMAN & RAFE PETERSEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES DESKBOOK (2003); STANFORD
ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001); TONY A. SULLINS, ESA:
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001); THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING
THE CONSERVATION PROMISE (Dale D. Goble et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY].
3. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., General Statistics for Endangered Species, http://
ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/TessStatReport (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). There are 612 animal
species and 746 plant species with at least part of their range in the United States listed under
the ESA as threatened or endangered. Id. This number is not expected to fall any time soon, as
climate change has been described as “a major threat to the survival of species and integrity of
ecosystems world-wide.” Philip E. Hulme, Adapting to Climate Change: Is There Scope for
Ecological Management in the Face of a Global Threat?, 42 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 784, 784
(2005). In its 2007 Synthesis Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts
that “[t]here is medium confidence that approximately 20 to 30% of species assessed so far are
likely to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in global average warming exceed 1.5 to
2.5°C (relative to 1980–1999),” and that if warming “exceeds about 3.5°C, model projections
suggest significant extinctions (40 to 70% species assessed) around the globe.”
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
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to address the collection of social, economic, and environmental
problems that seem most likely to present problems for species in the
foreseeable future. The ESA has long been the workhorse of species
protection in contexts for which a species-specific approach can
effectively be employed to address discrete human-induced threats
that have straightforward causal connections to the decline of a
species, such as clearing of occupied habitat for development or
damming of a river.4 Yet, is the statute adaptable to the sprawling,
sometimes global, phenomena that are wearing down our
environmental fabric on landscape scales through complex causal
mechanisms? Many seem to hope so,5 but I have my doubts about
whether trying to move in this direction makes the best use of the
ESA in the long run.
Consider, for example, three policy trends that have taken center
stage as offering traction on the problem set just described: (1)
6
greenhouse gas emission regulation to respond to climate change, (2)
the promotion of green building design to respond to the impacts of
7
urban development, and (3) the integration of ecosystem service and

REPORT 13–14 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ ar4_
syr_spm.pdf.
4. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Managing the Working Landscape, in THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY, supra note 2, at 101, 104 (“[ESA enforcement] has had
the greatest impact on active changes in species habitat (e.g., the construction of new
subdivisions, timber harvesting, and water diversions) . . . .”).
5. See, e.g., ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., USE OF THE POLAR BEAR
LISTING TO FORCE REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS
5–6 (2008), available at http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/08-Sept/RS22906.pdf (discussing the
Center for Biological Diversity’s campaign to address climate change issues through the
Endangered Species Act); Brenden R. Cummings & Kassie R. Siegel, Ursus maritimus: Polar
Bears on Thin Ice, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 3 (2007) (explaining their vision of the legal
consequences of their petition for polar bear listing).
6. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (requiring the Environmental
Protection Agency to determine the efficacy of greenhouse gas emission regulation under the
Clean Air Act). For summaries of proposed and adopted federal, state, and local climate
change measures, which is a fast-moving area of developments, see J.R. DeShazo & Jody
Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 1499, 1521–30 (2007); David R. Hodas, State Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE &
U.S. LAW 343, 343–69 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007); Stephen C. Jones & Paul R. McIntyre,
Filling the Vacuum: State and Regional Climate Change Initiatives, 38 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1640
passim (2007); PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, A LOOK AT EMISSIONS
TARGETS, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/targets (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
7. I use the term “green building” to refer to the practice of designing, constructing, and
operating buildings with greater attention to energy efficiency, water use efficiency, waste
reduction, toxics reduction, and use of recycled and other resource-efficient construction
materials. See U.S. EPA, Green Building, http://www.epa.gov/greenbuilding (last visited Mar. 7,
2009). The foremost compilation of green building techniques has come through the industry-
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natural capital values into environmental decision-making to respond
to unsustainable ecological resource uses.8 Because the problems that
have motivated these policy trends present clear and substantial
9
threats to species, one might reasonably assume that the ESA could
be aggressively employed to put these policies into motion. But that
is not nearly as firm a case as it may seem. This article explores why,
and offers an alternative strategy for the Obama Administration’s
ESA implementation.
Part II of the article identifies the practical limits the ESA faces
when its impressive regulatory power10 is aimed at problems like

led Leadership Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Green Building Rating System. See
U.S. Green Bldg. Council, LEED, http://www.usgbc.org/leed. The LEED initiative has
produced a series of rating systems for awarding “points” to buildings based on defined
attributes, such as building materials, siting, and energy efficient building techniques. See, e.g.,
U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, LEED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION & MAJOR RENOVATIONS
(2005), available at www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=1095 [hereinafter LEED FOR
NEW CONSTRUCTION]. There is also a growing movement to adopt green building codes to
integrate these techniques into state and local development regulations. See Sara Bronin, The
Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 231, 231–34, 240–48 (2008); Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Incentives to Promote
Sustainable Construction and Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More State
Land Use Policy Initiatives, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 731, 732 (2008); LES LO BAUGH, LEED
Green Building Incentives, in GREEN REAL ESTATE SUMMIT 2008: WHAT ATTORNEYS,
DEVELOPERS, BANKERS AND REGULATORS NEED TO KNOW 79 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 2008)
(providing a survey of federal, state, and local green building incentives and requirements). For
purposes of this article, I am not addressing the related practice of “green infrastructure,” which
eschews traditional “hard infrastructure” installed to support urban development—such as
curbs, gutters, and impervious drains—and prefers alternatives such as grassy swales, vegetative
buffers, and permeable pavements. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MANAGING
WET WEATHER WITH GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE: ACTION STRATEGY 2008 (2008), available at
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/gi-action-strategy.pdf; U.S. EPA, Basic Information: Green
Communities, http://www.epa.gov/greenkit/basicinformation.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
8. Ecosystem services are the economically valuable benefits humans derive from
ecological resources directly, such as storm surge mitigation provided by coastal dunes and
marshes, and indirectly, such as nutrient cycling that supports crop production. NATURE’S
SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 3–5 (Gretchen C. Daily ed.,
1997). Natural capital consists of the ecological resources that produce these service values,
such as forests, riparian habitat, and wetlands. Id. at 13. For the seminal discussion, see id. For
more extensive examinations of the status and future of ecosystem services and natural capital
in law and legal scholarship, see J.B. RUHL, STEVEN KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER LANT, THE LAW
AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and
Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157 (2007).
9. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3, at 13.
10. The ESA has been referred to as the “pit bull” of environmental laws. See, e.g., Steven
P. Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School, 15 ENVTL. F. 55, 55 (1998) (discussing the origins of this
reputation). For additional historical context highlighting the Act’s “overbearing statutory
certainty,” see Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, The Pronounced Presence and
Insistent Issues of the ESA, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 59 (2001).
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climate change, urbanization, and ecological fragmentation. As
powerful as it is when applied to acts that directly degrade intact
habitat, it becomes unwieldy and ineffective when causal mechanisms
are indirect (as in greenhouse gas emissions), not generally associated
with federal agency funding or authorization actions (as in green
building), or not generally associated with ecosystem attributes that
support species well-being (as in managing for ecosystem services).
Part III of the article argues that the structural constraints
described in Part II serve a salutary purpose. The ESA has been a
success story in federal environmental law for contexts in which
habitat condition is closely linked to species condition and the cause
11
of habitat degradation is direct and easily identified. Its resounding
12
success there, however, has led to the misperception that it can
duplicate that record anywhere and for any reason a species is at risk.
But the agencies delegated to administer the ESA, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service
13
(NMFS), cannot so easily flex the ESA to reach emerging policy
realms like greenhouse gas emissions regulation. Rather, unlike the
congressional design of the Clean Air Act,14 which the Supreme Court
recently described as built around the flexibility needed to broaden its
15
regulatory scope to accommodate new threats like climate change,
the congressional design of the ESA is better understood as to keep it
powerful but narrow in scope. That trade-off might keep the ESA
from addressing every source of stress affecting species, but it also
keeps the statute robust and durable for addressing a particular
category of stress—the conversion of intact habitat to other uses—
more effectively than any other environmental law has accomplished.

11. See J. Michael Scott et al., By the Numbers, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT
THIRTY, supra note 2, at 16, 29–32. While few species identified for protection under the ESA
have recovered to full health, the habitat conservation effects of the statute are credited with
preventing the vast majority of such species from ultimate extinction. Id.
12. Id.
13. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2008). The FWS administers the ESA for all terrestrial,
freshwater, and certain other specified species, and the NMFS (also known as NOAA-Fisheries)
administers the ESA for most marine species and anadromous fish. See id.
14. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000).
15. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007). In Massachusetts v. EPA, the
majority explained that
[w]hile the Congresses that drafted [the Clean Air Act] might not have appreciated the
possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming, they did understand
that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments
would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad language . . . reflects an
intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.
Id.
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Extending from that theme, Part IV argues that the FWS and
NMFS should not attempt to push the ESA into taking a leading role
in effectuating policy themes like greenhouse gas mitigation, green
building, and ecosystem service valuation. Rather, the agencies
should consolidate the ESA’s power into doing what it does best—
protecting habitat for species. This is not to say that the ESA has no
role in the development of policy regarding climate change, green
building, or ecosystem services. Rather, creative consolidation and
leveraging of the ESA’s habitat protection power could support the
formulation of effective measures for pursuing those and similar
policy objectives. Ultimately, however, to keep the ESA relevant, the
Obama Administration must keep its eye on habitat.
II. THE PRACTICAL BOUNDARIES OF ESA REGULATORY POWER
The central purpose of the ESA is to “provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved.”16 The FWS and NMFS administer
several core programs aimed toward that objective:
 The Listing Programs: Section 4 authorizes the agencies
17
to identify “endangered” and “threatened” species,
18
known as the listing function, and then to designate
19
20
“critical habitat” and develop “recovery plans” for
these species.
 Interagency Consultation and the Jeopardy Prohibition:
Section 7 requires all federal agencies to “consult” with
the FWS or NMFS (depending on the species) to ensure
that actions they carry out, fund, or authorize do not

16. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006).
17. Id. § 1532(6), (20).
18. Id. § 1522(a)(1). For a description of the listing process, see generally LIEBESMAN &
PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 15–20; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 2, at 38–58;
SULLINS, supra note 2, at 11–25; J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA: The Keystone of Species
Protection Law, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 19, 19–33.
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3). For a description of the critical habitat designation process, see
generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 20–24; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y,
supra note 2, at 59–69; SULLINS, supra note 2, at 26–28; Federico Cheever, Endangered Species
Act: Critical Habitat, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 47; Murray D.
Feldman & Michael J. Brennan, The Growing Importance of Critical Habitat for Species
Conservation, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 88 passim (2001).
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f). For a description of the recovery plan process, see generally
LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 24–26; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 2,
at 71–77; SULLINS, supra note 2, at 34–37; John M. Volkman, Recovery Planning, in LAW,
POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 71.
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“jeopardize” the continued existence of listed species or
“adversely modify” their critical habitat.21
 The Take Prohibition: Section 9 requires that all persons,
including all private and public entities subject to federal
jurisdiction, avoid committing “take” of listed species of
fish and wildlife.22
 Incidental Take Authorizations: Sections 7 (for federal
23
agency actions) and 10 (for actions not subject to section
24
7) establish a procedure and criteria for the FWS and
25
NMFS to approve “incidental take” of listed species.
These programs generate the regulatory firepower needed to
intervene in several categories of environmental change that cause
species decline: “(A) the present or threatened destruction,
modification, or curtailment of . . . habitat . . . ; (B) overutilization for
commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C)
disease or predation; . . . [and,] (E) other natural or manmade
26
factors . . . .” Of course, this authority is only useful in circumstances
where intervention is feasible and to the extent it is effective. For
27
example, habitat loss, the leading cause of species decline, is often
the result of easily identifiable human-induced factors susceptible to

21. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). For a description of the interagency consultation process, see
generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 27–39; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y,
supra note 2, at 83–103; SULLINS, supra note 2, at 59–86; Marilyn Averill, Protecting Species
Through Interagency Cooperation, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 87.
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). For a description of the cases developing the legal standards for
what constitutes “take,” see generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 39–46;
STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 2, at 104–12; SULLINS, supra note 2, at 44–54; Alan
M. Glen & Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity and Degree, 16
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 65 passim (2001); Gina Guy, Take Prohibitions and Section 9, in
LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 191; Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R.
Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities “Take” Listed Wildlife under ESA Section 9 and the
“Harm” Regulation?, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 207.
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).
24. Id. § 1539(a)(1).
25. “Incidental take,” although not explicitly defined in a specific statutory provision, is
described in section 10 of the statute as take that is “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B). The FWS, for example, has
adopted this meaning in regulations implementing section 7’s incidental take authorization. 50
C.F.R. § 402.02 (2008). For a description of the incidental take authorization procedures, see
generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 46–50; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y,
supra note 2, at 127–73; SULLINS, supra note 2, at 87–102.
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)–(E). These are the factors upon which listing decisions are
made.
27. See David Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United States,
48 BIOSCIENCE 607, 609, 609 tbl.2 (1998).
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discrete and effective regulation.28 By contrast, invasive species, the
runner-up in causes of species decline,29 typically present exceedingly
30
complex causes and solutions, meaning that there is usually no
identifiable regulatory target.
As a practical matter, three
circumstances largely define this divide between when the ESA is at
its most and least effective: (1) the nature of the causal mechanism
leading to species decline, (2) the degree of federal presence in that
causal mechanism, and (3) the closeness of match between the ESA’s
species-specific focus and the ecosystem management policy
objective.
A. Causal Mechanisms
The two regulatory arms of the ESA, the take prohibition and
the jeopardy prohibition, are limited in scope by demanding burdens
of proof that place tremendous stress on the statute when the cause of
a species’ decline involves indirect, diffuse, or cumulative
mechanisms.31 The take prohibition, for example, instructs that “with
respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife . . . it is unlawful
for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to . . .
take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of
32
the United States.” This broad prohibition applies to all federal,
state, and local governments and all private organizations and
individuals,33 anywhere “within the United States,” on public and
private lands alike. And through the statutory definition of “take,” it
applies to any acts that “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect” the protected species.34 From that list of
prohibited activities, moreover, the FWS and NMFS have by

28. Indeed, this is the source of the statute’s “pit bull” status and largely the reason it is so
controversial—discrete actions directly impairing habitat of protected species make for easy
targets of ESA regulation. See Glen & Douglas, supra note 22, at 68 (discussing the proof and
causation requirements necessary to demonstrate harm).
29. See Wilcove et al., supra note 27, at 609, 609 tbl.2.
30. See Peter M. Vitousek et al., Biological Invasions as Global Environmental Change, 84
AM. SCIENTIST 468, 472–77 (1996). For a series of articles covering the invasive species issue
comprehensively, see generally Special Section: Population Biology of Invasive Species, 17
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 24–92 (Fred W. Allendorf & Laura Lundquist eds., 2003).
31. I have explored this feature of the ESA in connection specifically with greenhouse gas
emissions in J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the
No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 39–49 (2008), from which the discussion in this article is
adapted.
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1), (a)(1)(B) (2006).
33. All of these entities fit the ESA’s definition of “person.” See id. § 1532(13).
34. Id. § 1532(19).

Ruhl_Fmt4.doc

Spring 2009]

7/6/2009 12:32:01 PM

KEEPING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT RELEVANT

283

regulation defined “harm” to include any modification of the species’
habitat that “actually kills or injures” individuals of the species “by
35
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns.”
Although the United States Supreme Court upheld the
regulatory definition of “harm” in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
36
Communities for a Great Oregon, the Court placed significant brakes
on the prosecution of take claims in indirect causation scenarios. The
harm definition extends the take prohibition from cases in which the
action causes direct death or injury (e.g., hunting, shooting, and
trapping), to cases in which causality is indirect—i.e., loss of habitat
that leads in some way to actual death or injury. However, theories
of indirect take can become quite attenuated and speculative.37 The
Court, in Sweet Home, found it appropriate in such cases to impose
the burden of proof on the proponent of the indirect harm theory.
Thus, the majority emphasized that the harm rule incorporates “but
for” causation, with “every term in the regulation’s definition of
‘harm’ . . . subservient to the phrase ‘an act which actually kills or
injures wildlife.’”38 Furthermore, the term should “be read to
incorporate ordinary requirements of proximate causation and
39
Since the Court established these tort-like
foreseeability.”
evidentiary burdens, the lower courts have steadfastly refused to
enforce the take prohibition based on attenuated indirect take
theories, enjoining case-specific instances of take only when death or
injury was proven to be likely and attributable to the defendant’s
actions.40

35. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2008) (FWS definition); id. § 222.102 (NMFS definition).
36. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704 (1995).
37. See Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424, 430–31 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (rejecting the ESA claim
for injunctive relief against a new subdivision based on the theory that some of the home owners
would have pet cats, some of the cats would wander into the habitat of a listed mouse, and some
of those cats would kill some of the mice). In the settlement of another round of litigation
initiated following the denial of the injunction request, the developer in Morrill nonetheless
agreed to prohibit house cats in the development. See William H. Satterfield et al., Who’s
Afraid of the Big Bad Beach Mouse?, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 13, 15 (1993) (citing
Developer Agrees to Protect Beach Mice, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 19, 1993).
38. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700 n.13 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3).
39. Id. at 696–97 n.9. In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor was more concise, limiting the
scope of the harm rule to “significant habitat modification that causes actual, as opposed to
hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to identifiable protected animals.” Id. at 708–09
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
40. For a thorough survey of the post-Sweet Home cases, see Glen & Douglas, supra note
22, at 68–69. For contrasting views on the feasibility of prosecuting take prohibition cases
against sources of greenhouse gas emissions, compare Ruhl, supra note 31, at 39–42 (arguing
that the agencies should exercise prosecutorial discretion not to pursue such cases), with Sarah
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Similarly, the jeopardy prohibition becomes difficult to apply in
complex indirect causation scenarios. The ESA requires that federal
agencies ensure actions they authorize, fund, or carry out are “not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined . . . to be
critical.”41 Agency regulations define “jeopardize” as “to engage in
an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to
reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of
a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or
distribution of that species.”42 But indirect effects are defined as
“those that are caused by the proposed action and are later in time,
43
but still are reasonably certain to occur.”
The “reasonably certain to occur” causal burden constrains the
use of jeopardy analysis when macro-scale theories of indirect
causation do not translate well into evidence of micro-scale causation.
At the macro-scale, for example, it is easy to construct a theory of
jeopardy causation for greenhouse gas emissions: power plants and
other federally-authorized sources emit greenhouse gases (a direct
effect of the action), greenhouse gases are reasonably certain to warm
the troposphere (an indirect effect of the action), a warming
troposphere is reasonably certain to adversely alter ecological
conditions, and it is reasonably expected that such ecological changes
will cause some species to decline to the point of jeopardy. At the
micro-scale, however, it becomes difficult to tag any individual source
of emissions as the jeopardizing agent for a species residing
44
potentially thousands of miles away.
This is not to say that the FWS and NMFS can simply ignore the
macro-scale effects of greenhouse gas emissions and other complex
indirect causal agents. They must list species as threatened or
Jane Morath, The Endangered Species Act: A New Avenue for Climate Change Litigation?, 29
PUB. LANDS & RESOURCES L. REV. 23, 35–40 (2008) (describing how section 9 could effectively
be used to regulate emissions through court injunctions).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
42. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2008).
43. Id.
44. As the U.S. Geological Survey recently stated, “It is currently beyond the scope of
existing science to identify a specific source of CO2 emissions and designate it as a cause of
specific climate impacts at an exact location.” Memorandum from Mark D. Meyers, Dir., U.S.
Geological Survey, to Dir., Fish & Wildlife Serv., on The Challenges of Linking Carbon
Emissions, Atmospheric Greenhouse Gas Concentrations, Global Warming, and Consequential
Impacts 2 (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.doi.gov/issues/polar_bears/
challengesoflinkingcarbonemissions3.pdf.
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endangered by the effects of climate change, invasive species, and
similar threats.45 Moreover, they must consider macro-scale indirect
effects when preparing recovery plans, conducting interagency
46
jeopardy consultations, and reviewing incidental take permits.
Rather, when causal mechanisms operate primarily on the macroscale through indirect, diffuse, cumulative effects, applications of the
take and jeopardy prohibitions at the micro-scale—to specific
emission sources, buildings, or land uses—tend to stretch the
causation analysis beyond the ESA’s comfort zone.
B. Federal Presence
Even if the FWS and NMFS were to decide to aggressively use
the jeopardy prohibition to regulate indirect causal mechanisms at
micro-scales, notwithstanding the difficulty of satisfying burdens of
proof, another constraint is that the prohibition applies only to
actions federal agencies authorize, fund, or carry out. As broad and
deep as federal agencies have reached into the American economy
and society, many sources of species decline remain outside the scope
of federal agency “action,” as so defined. General regulation of a
field through federal standards does not trigger the need for interagency consultation on non-federal actions that must comply with

45. FWS and NOAA have each listed species based on threats from climate change
impacts. See, e.g., Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus)
Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212 (May 15, 2008); Endangered and Threatened
Species: Final Listing Determinations for Elkhorn Coral and Staghorn Coral, 71 Fed. Reg.
26,852 (May 9, 2006). For the argument that they must do so even if the ESA’s regulatory
programs can do little about greenhouse gas emissions, see Ruhl, supra note 31, at 32–35.
Indeed, at a press conference announcing the FWS polar bear listing, Secretary of the Interior
Dirk Kempthorne warned that “while the legal standards under the ESA compel me to list the
polar bear as threatened, I want to make clear that this listing will not stop global climate
change or prevent any sea ice from melting.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office
of the Sec’y, Secretary Kempthorne Announces Decision to Protect Polar Bears under
Endangered Species Act (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/
08_News_Releases/080514a.html. The Obama Administration has not changed course in this
regard. On May 8, 2009, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar announced the agency’s decision
to not provide additional protections to the polar bear, proclaiming that “the Endangered
Species Act is not the proper mechanism for controlling our nation’s carbon emissions.” Press
Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Salazar Retains Conservation Rule for Polar Bears
Underlines Need for Comprehensive Energy and Climate Legislation (May 8, 2009), available at
http://www.fws.gov/news/NewsReleases/showNews.cfm?newsId=20FB90B6-A188-DB0104788E0892D91701.
46. See Ruhl, supra note 31, at 37–53; see, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne,
506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 369–70 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that the FWS acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by failing to address the effects of climate change in an interagency jeopardy
consultation).
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those standards; rather, a federal agency must fund or authorize the
specific non-federal action.
For example, the construction and operation of buildings are
significant indirect causes of ecological degradation leading to species
decline. Building construction consumes wood and other raw
materials, the production of which can adversely affect ecological
integrity, and building operations consume electricity, the production
source of which may be emitting greenhouse gases.47 Green building
techniques are designed to promote the use of recycled building
products and energy efficient operations, and thus could indirectly
promote recovery of listed species.48 Yet green building techniques
have been formulated primarily by private organizations and codified,
if at all, primarily by state and local governments.49 It is unlikely that
federal agencies will ever have much to do directly with the
authorization or funding of non-federal buildings qua buildings—land
use regulation, including issuance of zoning and building permits, is
50
traditionally the domain of state and local governments. While the
federal government has exercised limited regulatory jurisdiction over
green building design through codified standards, such as for energy
efficiency,51 it has not ventured into promulgating comprehensive
building permit programs of any kind, much less specifically for green
building.52 In the absence of that federal action nexus, the FWS and
47. See U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, THE NORTH AMERICAN CARBON
BUDGET AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL CARBON CYCLE 6 (2007). Electricity
consumption by buildings, which accounts for two-thirds of all electricity consumed in North
America, is one of the largest factors contributing to North American greenhouse gas emissions.
See id.
48. I explore the intersection of the ESA and green building policy in more detail in J.B.
Ruhl, Cities, Green Construction, and the Endangered Species Act, 27 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
(forthcoming May 2009).
49. See Circo, supra note 7, passim.
50. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 173–74 (2001) (describing the “States’ traditional and primary power over land and water
use”).
51. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6832(15), 6833(a)–(b) (2006). The Energy Policy Act of 1992 requires
states to compare energy efficiency standards in their respective residential and commercial
building codes to model codes, such as the Council on American Building Officials’ Model
Energy Code, including as those codes are periodically updated. See id.
52. See Bronin, supra note 7, at 246–59; Circo, supra note 7, at 771–73. The federal
government has actively promulgated green building standards for federal buildings. See, e.g.,
10 C.F.R. pt. 435 (2008) (stating mandatory energy conservation standards for federal
buildings). The National Institute of Building Design’s Whole Building Design Guide website
follows, among many other things, the development of federal green building mandates. See
Whole Building Design Guide, Federal Mandates, http://www.wbdg.org/references/
federal_mandates.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
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NMFS would be hard-pressed to use the ESA to require green
building on the basis that it is necessary to avoid jeopardy of a
species—the causal mechanisms are decidedly indirect to begin with
(which also limits the reach of the take prohibition to mandate green
building), and there is no broad federal permitting program nexus
through which to reach green building activity in any event.
C. Species-Specific Context
Ultimately, although the ESA is intended to conserve
ecosystems, it is only the ecosystems of listed endangered and
threatened species that the statute reaches. Moreover, even in this
sense, the conservation of ecosystems is incidental to the conservation
of listed species. Indeed, the word “ecosystem” appears only once in
the statute, in the purpose statement, and from there the statute is
fixated on species. The FWS and NMFS list species, designate critical
habitat of species, prepare species recovery plans, and take and
jeopardy of species are prohibited.
If particular ecosystem
management polices do not somehow tie into one of the ESA’s
species-specific programs, the statute provides no direct basis for the
FWS and NMFS to pursue them.
To be sure, where species conservation demands ecosystem
conservation, the ESA works well to serve its purpose. But some
policies designed to promote ecosystem conservation, such as making
greater use of ecosystem services valuation in decision-making, have
little to do with conservation of listed species. At its core, the
ecosystem services concept is anthropocentric and utilitarian.53 There
may in some cases be a serendipitous match between ecosystem
conservation on behalf of a listed species and ecosystem conservation
on behalf of human ecosystem service values, but there might just as
often be a conflict between the two, in which case the FWS and
NMFS must keep their eyes on species conservation as the primary
goal. More to the point, however, is the fact that the FWS and NMFS
cannot do anything directly under the ESA to promote sustainability

53. RUHL, KRAFT & LANT, supra note 8, at 15.
It is important not to confuse ecosystem functions, which are ubiquitous, with
ecosystem services, which are the consequence of only some ecosystem functions.
The critical difference between the two, and which makes the development of
ecosystem services policy both complicated and controversial, is that ecosystem
services have relevance only to the extent human populations benefit from them.
They are purely anthropocentric.
Id.
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of ecosystem services, or any other ecosystem management policy, if
doing so cannot be linked to conservation of a listed species.
III. KEEPING THE ESA FOCUSED ON HABITAT
So what? So what if the ESA cannot easily be used to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions, require green building, and demand that
ecosystem services be valued? The likely response is that if the
problems these policies are designed to mitigate are in fact causing
species decline, the nation’s most powerful species conservation law
ought to play a leading role in promoting the policies. But this
approach conflates the purpose of the ESA and the power of the
ESA. The purpose of the statute is to conserve ecosystems on which
listed species depend for survival, but the power of the statute to do
so is derived from the narrow focus around which it is designed.
The ESA, perhaps to the chagrin of its most ardent supporters, is
at bottom a harm-preventing law, not a benefit-mandating law.
Causing take or jeopardy of species is prohibited, but promoting the
recovery of species is nowhere required by the statute. The courts
have interpreted recovery plans, for example, to have no mandatory
54
effect on federal agencies, much less anyone else. They are plans,
and that’s it. The criteria for issuance of incidental take permits
require little more than that the effects of the take are minimized and
mitigated “to the maximum extent practicable,”55 and do not require
that the permittee provide net benefits to the species.56 Even section
7(a)(1) of the statute, which requires federal agencies to “utilize their
authorities . . . by carrying out programs for the conservation of
endangered species,”57 has been interpreted by the FWS, NMFS, and
courts to require essentially no specific affirmative efforts to promote

54. See LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 25–26; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y,
supra note 2, at 76–77.
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Norton, 306 F. Supp.
2d 920, 928 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (agreeing with the FWS that full mitigation of take effects is not
required if it is not practicable).
56. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B). For example, incidental permits issued under section
10(a)(1)(B) need only ensure that the permittee’s actions “will not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild.” Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv).
Courts have declined to interpret this standard as requiring net benefits to the species. See Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. FWS, 202 F. Supp. 2d 594, 624–46 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
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species recovery.58 The ESA punishes those who do bad to species,
but does nothing to make anyone do good.
Yet it is important to have such a law, one that calls off businessas-usual when business-as-usual has led a species to the brink, and
which, when that alarm is sounded, bears down on the most
important factor—keeping intact habitat of listed species at bay from
conversion to other land uses. To be sure, there are many flaws in the
way the ESA works even in this respect, but I would rather we focus
on improving the ESA in this narrow sense than trying to use it to
turn the FWS and NMFS into the nation’s greenhouse gas and green
building police. Putting aside the political cost the agencies would
pay were they to try that, the reality is that they are simply not
designed or equipped to do so. The FWS and NMFS are resource
conservation agencies, not pollution control or building design
agencies.
As the Supreme Court has pithily observed, “Agencies, like
legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell
regulatory swoop. They instead whittle away at them over time,
refining their approach as circumstances change and as they develop a
more-nuanced understanding of how best to proceed.”59 The ESA
was not designed to resolve all sources of species’ decline in “one fell
regulatory swoop,” and the FWS and NMFS are not the only agencies
whittling away at the large problem of ecosystem degradation. They
will best serve the purpose of the ESA if they focus on whittling at
their part of the problem—conserving intact habitat—and
coordinating with other federal, state, and local agencies about how
doing so can contribute to the comprehensive development of climate
change, green building, and ecosystem services policies.
IV. CONSOLIDATING AND LEVERAGING ESA-BASED HABITAT
CONSERVATION
Although the ESA is poorly-equipped, and arguably not even
intended, to directly implement policies like greenhouse gas
regulation, green building, and ecosystem service valuation, the
habitat protection function of the ESA can contribute directly to the
broader goals of such policies (responding to climate change,
58. See J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and
Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies’ Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L.
1107, 1107 (1995) (explaining the legal background of section 7(a)(1) and proposing a more
demanding standard).
59. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457 (2007) (citation omitted).
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urbanization, and ecological degradation, respectively) and indirectly
to their implementation. The FWS and NMFS can promote both
effects by consolidating the habitat protection function to identify
direct connections between habitat conservation and climate change,
urbanization, or ecosystem services, and then leveraging the link to
habitat to provide additional policy support where possible.
A. Consolidating Habitat Conservation
By consolidating habitat conservation, I mean aggressively using
the habitat protection opportunities of the statute directly in support
of the policy goals of responding to climate change, urbanization, and
ecological degradation. Its focus may be narrow, but the ESA is
nonetheless equipped to directly address effects of climate change,
urbanization, and ecological degradation through its habitat
protection function.
For example, the ESA authorizes the FWS and NMFS to
designate critical habitat as including “specific areas outside the
geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed . . .,
upon a determination by the [FWS or NMFS] that such areas are
60
essential for the conservation of the species.” This could provide the
FWS and NMFS a powerful mechanism for responding aggressively
to ecological transitions caused by climate change. To the extent that
models can predict with reasonable certainty where a species might
successfully migrate to adapt to ecological changes brought about by
climate change, a credible interpretation of the provision would allow
the agency to “reserve” those areas through critical habitat
designations.61 Those designations would help reduce the effects of
human land uses in such areas, thus securing a greater chance for the

60. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) (2006).
61. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for
the Preble’s Meadow Jumping Mouse (Zapus hudsonius preblei), 68 Fed. Reg. 37,276, 37,285
(June 23, 2003) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.40, 17.95 (2008)). The FWS took an approach
like this with respect to the Preble’s meadow jumping mouse, deciding to include small
mountain streams in the species’ critical habitat, even though larger streams are more important
to the species, on the ground that “Preble’s populations along mountain streams may be less
subject to certain threats including . . . long-term climate change.” Id. On the other hand, it
declined to do so for the Spreading navarretia plant. A commenter suggested that the critical
habitat should “include areas of unoccupied suitable habitat that would provide for recovery
opportunities, including . . . migration in response to climate change,” but the agency merely
observed that “critical habitat designations do not signal that habitat outside the designation is
unimportant or may not be required for recovery.” Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and
Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for Navarretia Fossalis (Spreading Navarretia), 70 Fed.
Reg. 60,658, 60,662 (Oct. 18, 2005) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.12, 17.96 (2008)).
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species to withstand climate change transitions and establish a viable
population in its new ecological home.
Similarly, although the ESA may not be useful for controlling the
indirect effects of urbanization, it has proven quite effective in
promoting local jurisdictions to integrate the habitat effects of
expanding urbanization into land use decisions. The greenhouse gas
emissions effect of a building’s electricity consumption may be far
beyond the effective reach of the take and jeopardy prohibitions, but
the habitat conversion effects of the building’s land footprint are not.
Numerous state and local jurisdictions have entered into “regional
habitat conservation plans,” which are essentially large-scale
incidental take permits administered to manage ESA compliance for
public and private land development within the jurisdiction.62 By
promoting jurisdiction-wide attention to habitat conservation, the
regional permitting process can lead directly to less urbanization,
which helps reduce greenhouse gas emissions and preserve natural
capital, and can also indirectly spur attention to land use and building
design techniques that are compatible with reducing greenhouse gas
emissions and sustaining ecosystem services.
B. Leveraging Habitat Conservation
By leveraging habitat conservation, I mean taking advantage of
the regulatory consequences of habitat protection, once it is in place
under the take and jeopardy prohibitions, to promote other policies
working toward the same ends. The point is that while the ESA may
not be able to require reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, use of
green building techniques, or management for ecosystem services, so
long as the primary regulatory target of habitat protection is met, the
ESA is by no means out of the picture for promoting these other
policy objectives.
For example, conservation banking—where one landowner
voluntarily conserves habitat to “market” as “credits” to other
landowners in need of mitigation habitat required for issuance of an
incidental take permit—is increasingly the mitigation method of

62. See TIMOTHY BEATLY, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING: ENDANGERED SPECIES
URBAN GROWTH 23–39 (1994) (providing a survey of early regional permits). For
contrasting views on the regional permit experience, compare Alejandro E. Camacho, Can
Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293
(2007) (criticizing regional permits), with Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans:
Frayed Safety Nets or Creative Partnerships?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 94 (2001) (favoring
regional permits).
AND
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choice under the ESA.63 Although a habitat conservation bank may
only market habitat credits under the ESA, it may also be able to
market credits for carbon sequestration and ecosystem services as
similar compliance techniques are developed in furtherance of
climate change and ecosystem services policies. The FWS and NMFS
could point to this synergy as a beneficial (and potentially profitable)
effect of engaging in habitat conservation banking.
Other ESA actions provide opportunities for the agencies to
highlight this kind of synergy. When designating critical habitat for
listed species, for example, the agencies must take into account the
“economic impact” of extending that status to the identified area. To
the extent that the protected status of the critical habitat could
enhance its capacity to provide carbon sequestration and ecosystem
services, those benefits should enter into the economic impact
64
analysis. Similarly, when designing recovery plans for species, the
FWS and NMFS could point to the incidental benefits species-based
habitat conservation provides for carbon sequestration and ecosystem
service values, thus illustrating that the cost accounting of habitat
conservation for species recovery purposes should recognize the
economic benefits of these collateral effects.65 Recovery plans for
species listed on the basis of climate-forced impacts, moreover, could
point to the macro-scale benefits green building and greenhouse gas
emission reductions are likely to have for the species. Hence, once
the FWS and NMFS have fulfilled the primary habitat protection

63. See Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Conservation Banks, 68
Fed. Reg. 24,753 (May 8, 2003). For an overview of ESA conservation banking policy and
practice, see J.B. Ruhl, Alan Glen & David Hartman, A Practical Guide to Habitat Banking
Law and Policy, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 26, 26 (2005). Caution is required in designing
such habitat trading programs, however, to ensure market forces do not produce unintended
consequences, such as habitat fragmentation. See Jamison E. Colburn, Trading Spaces: Habitat
“Banking” under Fish & Wildlife Service Policy, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 33, 33 (2005);
James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53
STAN. L. REV. 607, 624–44 (2000).
64. Unfortunately, the agencies have steadfastly declined to take this approach when it has
been suggested in public comments to proposed critical habitat designations, either ignoring the
issue altogether or arguing that it is beyond the agencies’ capacity to “monetize” such benefits
and omitting any qualitative discussion of the potential for such benefits. See, e.g., Designation
of Critical Habitat for Helianthus Paradoxus (Pecos Sunflower), 73 Fed. Reg. 17,762, 17,765
(Apr. 1, 2008) (stating the agency’s inability to monetize); Revised Designation of Critical
Habitat for the Tidewater Goby (Eucyclogobius newberryi), 73 Fed. Reg. 5,920, 5,927 (Jan. 31,
2008) (failing to mention ecosystem services in response to public comment).
65. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(iii) (2006) (stating that when preparing recovery plans,
the agencies must provide “estimates of the . . . cost to carry out those measures needed to
achieve the plan’s goals”).
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function of the ESA, they can put it to work in numerous ways to
support policies outside the direct reach of the statute but consistent
with the overall objective of species conservation.
V. CONCLUSION
The species imperilment problem has become intractable, and
neither the Obama, nor any future, Administration will solve it, but
rather can hope only to manage it. Few human activities, from
belching power plants down to a person turning on the kitchen water
tap, do not contribute in some degree to the problem. The sources of
species imperilment are ubiquitous, and imperiled species are
ubiquitous. This does not mean, however, that the ESA is ubiquitous.
Those who fear for the ESA’s enduring relevance in an increasingly
complex world of species imperilment may argue that the statute
must be carried and applied to each and every context in which
human activity contributes in some way to species decline, but this is
simply impracticable and, more importantly, not the design of the
statute.
Rather, I have argued in this article that the ESA will be most
effective when the FWS and NMFS use it to “whittle away” at the
species imperilment problem by focusing the statute’s power on what
it and the agencies are best equipped to address—arresting
conversion of habitat to other uses. Habitat protection on these
grounds alone will contribute to broader policies such as responding
to climate change, promoting green building, and valuing ecosystem
services. With creative use of this focused application of the statute
and through coordination with other agencies “whittling away” at
these problems through their respective authorities, the FWS and
NMFS can also leverage habitat protection to further support (but
not require) these policy goals. In this way the ESA surely will not
become ubiquitous, but it will remain relevant.

